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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[M]addeningly abstract and untethered to the real world,” “a system that 
each year proves more unworkable,” “[yielding] bizarre and arbitrary effects” – 
these are just a few voices in the chorus of complaints levied by judges, justices, 
prosecutors, and academics against the “categorical approach” to the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (ACCA).1  
ACCA provides a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for offenders 
who illegally possess a firearm and have three prior convictions for a “violent 
felony” or “serious drug offense.”2 The categorical approach is the method for 
determining whether an offense or prior conviction fits within ACCA’s 
definition of “violent felony.”3 Under the categorical approach, sentencing 
courts are prohibited from looking at the actual facts underlying a conviction, 
and instead must make a determination by looking solely at the statutory 
elements of the crime.4 This willful blindness to factual criminal conduct in 
favor of a complex legal doctrine is often criticized for producing unfair and 
counterintuitive results, taxing judicial economy, and allowing habitual 
criminals to escape punishment based on legal technicalities alone.5  
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Jonathan Wroblewski, Michelle Morales, and Jordan Leiter for exemplifying the values of 
public service and patiently teaching me this oftentimes difficult topic as a summer intern at 
the United States Department of Justice, Office of Policy and Legislation; to Professor 
Christopher J. Walker, Director of the Moritz Washington Summer Program, for making 
such an opportunity possible and for his unwavering commitment to putting students first; 
and to the editors of the Ohio State Law Journal for all their hard work on this piece.  
 1 See Tristan v. United States, No. 6:16-cv-01137-AA, 2018 WL 3117637, at *3 n.2 
(D. Or. June 25, 2018) (cataloguing a list of complaints by federal judges and academics 
about the categorical approach) (quoting Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2258 
(2016) (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v. Valdiva–Flores, 876 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring)).  
 2 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). 
 3 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CATEGORICAL APPROACH: 2016 ANNUAL 
NATIONAL SEMINAR (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-
national-training-seminar/2016/backgrounder_categorical-approach.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B2EC-ZA8H] (outlining “the four steps in the categorical approach and 
defin[ing] key term [sic] frequently used in the analysis”). 
 4 Id.  
 5 See, e.g., Sheldon A. Evans, Punishing Criminals for Their Conduct: A Return to 
Reason for the Armed Career Criminal Act, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 624–25 (2018) 
(describing the background of Mathis, where a habitual child molester with multiple burglary 
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The Supreme Court decided three ACCA cases in the October 2018 term: 
United States v. Stitt, United States v. Sims, and Stokeling v. United States.6 The 
increased attention on ACCA brought by these cases has spurred renewed 
criticisms of the many problems associated with the categorical approach.7 
Despite the continuing debate over the viability of ACCA and the categorical 
approach, the current composition of the Court makes it unclear (if not unlikely) 
that the Court would have been willing to make fundamental changes to nearly 
thirty years of ACCA precedent.8 While many call for the abolition of ACCA 
and the categorical approach entirely, this Note will argue that a less radical 
approach would have sufficed to bring focus and legitimacy back to ACCA 
doctrine.9 
 
convictions escaped enhanced sentencing based on categorical approach application to an 
Iowa burglary statute).  
 6 United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018); United States v. Sims, 854 F.3d 1037 
(8th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018); 
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 549 (2018). 
 7 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, SCOTUS Grants Cert on Yet Another Set of ACCA 
Cases, This Time to Explore When Burglary Qualifies as “Burglary,” SENT’G L. & POL’Y 
(Apr. 23, 2018, 9:59 AM), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/201
8/04/scotus-grants-cert-on-yet-another-set-of-acca-cases-this-time-to-explore-when-
burglary-qualifies-as-.html [https://perma.cc/5CTD-38QC] (expressing annoyance because 
“issues related to the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act continued to be the focal 
point of so much SCOTUS activity”); see also Thomas T. Cullen, Opinion, Protecting 
Americans from Violent Offenders, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/aug/2/why-congress-should-take-action-on-
the-armed-caree/ [https://perma.cc/MBJ4-NUSK] (arguing that the results from the ACCA 
have been “inconsistent and absurd”).  
 8 Justice Alito and possibly Justices Ginsburg and Breyer are the only Justices 
currently on the Court who have expressed an interest in voting to overrule the categorical 
approach. See Evan Tsen Lee, Mathis v. U.S. and the Future of the Categorical Approach, 
101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 263, 270–71 (2016), 
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Lee-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G5M2-VADZ]. Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh lack a sufficient 
Supreme Court record to fully evaluate their positions on this issue, however both faithfully 
applied ACCA and the categorical approach in their time as circuit court judges. See United 
States v. Haight, 892 F.3d 1271, 1279–81 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J.); United States v. 
Huizar, 688 F.3d 1193, 1194 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.). Finally, it was further unlikely 
that the Court would have deviated too far from established ACCA doctrine when the parties 
did not raise the argument in their briefs. The Court would probably not be willing to act sua 
sponte to overturn long held precedent regarding ACCA. Cf. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 
1204, 1207, 1217 (2018) (finding it “significant” that the Government failed to argue for the 
abandonment of the “categorical approach” in favor of a fact-based approach to an 
immigration statute’s “aggravated felony” definition).  
 9 This Note does not dismiss the many ACCA critiques or innovative proposed ACCA 
fixes. There have been many compelling calls for overturning Taylor and the categorical 
approach entirely in favor of a conduct-based approach. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 
136 S. Ct. 2243, 2269–71 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 
254, 280–81 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). See generally Evans, supra note 5, at 623 
(surveying state habitual-offender statutes, with a strong emphasis on conduct-based 
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For too long, courts have taken a myopic view of the categorical approach, 
losing sight of its fundamental purpose somewhere in the twenty-five year string 
of highly technical, “piecemeal,” and “Scrabble-like” ACCA decisions.10 The 
proper remedy to this affliction is to refocus on the original intents and purposes 
of ACCA and the categorical approach as articulated in the seminal case Taylor 
v. United States.11 Federal courts should put less emphasis on procedural 
formalism, and should instead strive to accomplish ACCA’s purpose of 
identifying violent career felons, while mitigating fairness and due process 
concerns.12 Stitt, Sims, and Stokeling offered a critical opportunity to bring 
ACCA doctrine back down to the “real world” without completely giving up on 
the laudable goals of the categorical approach.13 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II will introduce the categorical 
approach, laying out how the doctrine applies to each of the three significant 
statutory components of the Armed Career Criminal Act—the enumerated-
felonies clause, the elements clause, and the now defunct residual clause. In Part 
III, this Note will lay out the procedural, factual, and legal background of Stitt, 
Sims, and Stokeling. In Part IV, ACCA and the categorical approach’s 
foundational values and purposes are explored and applied to each of these 
Supreme Court cases. Part V will briefly conclude.  
II. ACCA AND THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH 
The Armed Career Criminal Act provides a maximum sentence of life and 
minimum sentence of fifteen years for any felon caught illegally possessing a 
firearm with three prior convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug 
offense.”14 The ACCA statute defines a “violent felony” as “any crime 
 
approaches). Some have gone as far as proposing a new agency to compile and maintain a 
list of qualifying state statutes. See Avi M. Kupfer, A Comprehensive Administrative Solution 
to the Armed Career Criminal Act Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 151, 166 (2014). Recently, 
the United States Attorney General proposed a legislative fix to ACCA. See Jeff Sessions, 
U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks Calling for a Legislative Fix to the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-
remarks-calling-legislative-fix-armed-career-criminal [https://perma.cc/DKP8-N5M6]. But 
see Douglas A. Berman, Senators Orrin Hatch and Tom Cotton Proposing Johnson Fix to 
Expand Reach of Armed Career Criminal Act, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Aug. 2, 2018, 12:51 AM), 
https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2018/08/-senators-orrin-hatch-
and-tom-cotton-proposing-johnson-fix-to-expand-reach-of-armed-career-criminal-.html 
[https://perma.cc/2QY3-S6L5] (“[T]he Armed Career Criminal Act is long overdue for a fix, 
but the solution presented here strikes me as problematic because it expands the reach of a 
severe mandatory minimum and still has ACCA’s reach turn on prior offense definitions.”).  
 10 Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 11 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).  
 12 Id. at 581–82. 
 13 See Tristan v. United States, No. 6:16-cv-01137-AA, 2018 WL 3117637, at *3 n.2 
(D. Or. June 25, 2018). 
 14 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). Of the two predicate offense definitions, the “violent 
felony” definition is more prolific and disputed than the “serious drug offense” definition, 
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punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another” or “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk 
of physical injury to another . . . .”15  
Importantly, Taylor v. United States formally imposed a “categorical 
approach” on the process of determining what actually qualifies as a violent 
felony.16 Under the categorical approach, the court adopts a willful blindness to 
the facts underlying each conviction.17 Regardless of whether the defendant 
actually used violent force in the commission of the crime, the conviction will 
not qualify as a violent felony unless the elements of the crime pass muster under 
the categorical approach.18 In this way, the categorical approach functions like 
an “on-off switch,” meaning a state statute qualifies as a predicate offense in 
either all cases or none.19 This has led to criticisms that the categorical approach 
creates a “windfall” for dangerous criminal offenders who are able to escape 
sentencing enhancement for crimes they actually committed with violent 
force.20 Another common complaint is the unwieldiness and complexity of 
delving into the minutiae of state criminal law every time a sentence 
enhancement is challenged.21  
The definition of “violent felony” has traditionally been broken down into 
three parts: the elements clause (sometimes called the “force” clause), the 
enumerated-felonies clause, and the residual clause.22 The categorical approach 
applies uniquely to all three components.23 
 
but ACCA drug cases are still prevalent. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 
1266–67 (11th Cir. 2014) (considering the general definition of a “drug trafficking 
aggravated felony”).   
 15 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 16 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. This Note does not endeavor to recount the entire long and 
tortured history of the categorical approach. For a more in-depth analysis, see Evans, supra 
note 5, at 628–42.     
 17 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–01. 
 18 Id. at 602. 
 19 Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 268 (2013). 
 20 See Lee, supra note 8, at 270.   
 21 See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 885 F.3d 984, 991 (6th Cir. 2018) (Sutton, J.) (“How 
odd to dissect the precise contours of all New York robbery convictions but one: the 
conviction of today’s criminal defendant.”). 
 22 See generally 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habitual Criminals, Etc. § 27 (2018) (documenting 
applications of the ACCA). 
 23 Id.  
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A. The Elements Clause 
The first significant component of ACCA is the elements clause, also known 
as the force clause.24 When trying to ascertain whether an offense qualifies as a 
violent felony under this clause, the sentencing judge will look at the crime of 
conviction’s bare elements and determine if they necessarily require the use of 
“physical force.”25  
Like almost everything in ACCA doctrine, the precise meaning of the 
elements clause and the term “physical force” has been the subject of dispute.26 
In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “physical force” in the 
elements clause should be interpreted to mean “violent force,” or force capable 
of causing pain or physical injury to another person.27  Four years later, in 
United States v. Castleman, the Court distinguished “minor uses of force” that 
suffice for a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from the “substantial 
degree of force” required by violent felonies under ACCA.28  
In engaging in a categorical approach inquiry into whether a conviction 
qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause, the court will look at a 
state’s criminal jurisprudence to determine whether the state conviction 
necessarily requires “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another” as an element.29 If a survey of state case law 
reveals the state robbery statute in question has been interpreted and applied to 
offenders who only used de minimis force or mere intimidation, the conviction 
does not qualify as an ACCA predicate.30 
Circuits have split over whether robbery by threat or intimidation is 
sufficient to “include as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another.” For example, in United States v. 
Parnell, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Massachusetts armed robbery does not 
necessarily require “the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force” 
because the statute does not necessitate the weapon to be displayed or the victim 
 
 24 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (“[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force against the person of another . . . .”). 
 25 See, e.g., United States v. Gabourel, 192 F. Supp. 3d 667, 674–76 (W.D. Va. 2016) 
(applying this analysis to a California statute requiring the defendant to “maliciously and 
willfully discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, occupied 
motor vehicle, occupied aircraft, inhabited housecar . . . or inhabited camper . . . .”).  
 26 See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).  
 27 Id. 
 28 United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 164–66 (2014).  
 29 Hunter v. United States, 873 F.3d 388, 390 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. 
Ellison, 866 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2017)). 
 30 See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 803–04 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding 
North Carolina common law robbery does not qualify as a violent felony because defendant’s 
act of pushing the victim's hand off of a carton of cigarettes was sufficient “actual force” to 
uphold a common law robbery conviction).  
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to be put in fear.31 Accordingly, Massachusetts armed robbery does not qualify 
as a “violent felony” under the ACCA elements clause.32  
The other major area of controversy within elements clause jurisprudence 
(and the source of dispute in Stokeling) is whether the level of “physical force” 
required in a state offense rises to the level of “violent” force as defined by 
Johnson.33 This issue commonly arises when a state criminalizes common law 
petty larceny offenses, like purse-snatching or pickpocketing, within its robbery 
statute.34 For example, in United States v. Mulkern, the First Circuit looked at 
Maine robbery and determined from a survey of Maine case law that the crime 
could be accomplished with “any physical force.”35 The court interpreted “any 
physical force” to include de minimis physical force that falls below the 
threshold of “violent force” required by ACCA and Johnson.36 Unable to look 
at the facts underlying the conviction, the categorical approach required the First 
Circuit to disqualify the entire Maine robbery statute as an ACCA predicate. 37  
Put another way, the categorical approach is interested in the “least forceful 
conduct” that can be criminalized under a state statute.38 A state robbery offense 
will not qualify under ACCA if it criminalizes conduct that is less severe or 
substantially different from the conduct in the generic definition of robbery.39 
One of the original justifications for the categorical approach was protecting 
defendants from overbroad statutes.40 Wide variations in state offense labeling 
 
 31 United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2016). But see United States v. 
Harris, 844 F.3d 1260, 1268–69 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding robberies by threat or intimidation 
are violent felonies in Colorado because they constitute “threatened use of physical force”).  
 32 Parnell, 818 F.3d at 981. 
 33 Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 
 34 See, e.g., United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 685 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Jones 
v. Commonwealth, 496 S.E.2d 668 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)) (relying on a Virginia state case to 
hold that Virginia common law robbery did not qualify as a violent felony because “physical 
jerking” of a purse tucked into victim’s arm, which caused victim to fall to the ground, did 
not rise to the level of “physical force” as cognized by ACCA); Austin v. United States, 280 
F. Supp. 3d 567, 573–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (discussing force requirements of pickpocketing, 
“tug-of-war,” and purse-snatching compared to ACCA).  
 35 United States v. Mulkern, 854 F.3d 87, 93–94 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Raymond v. 
State, 467 A.2d 161, 165 (Me. 1983)). 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 94. 
 38 Perez v. United States, 885 F.3d 984, 987 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Because our touchstone 
is whether the crime requires physical force, not whether the criminal 
conduct involves physical force, our test case becomes the least forceful conduct generally 
criminalized under the statute. The predicate conviction qualifies if that conduct involves 
violent physical force.”). 
 39 See United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260, 1268 n.8 (10th Cir. 2017) (listing cases 
where state robbery offenses have been found to be violent felonies). 
 40 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 585 (1990) (citing Armed Career Criminal 
Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4639 and H.R. 4768 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 15 (1986) (statement of James Knapp, Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
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risked lumping together misdemeanor and technical burglaries with the more 
serious offenses originally cognized by ACCA.41 
B. The Enumerated-Felonies Clause 
The second significant component of ACCA is the enumerated-felonies 
clause.42 Applying the categorical approach to an enumerated clause case is a 
multi-step process where the sentencing court compares a state conviction for 
“burglary, arson, [or] extortion” to the “generic” definition of those crimes.43 
This inquiry is designed to ensure that the same conduct is criminalized across 
jurisdictions, despite the wide variation among state criminal codes and criminal 
offense labeling.44 
The first step in any categorical approach analysis is to look at the state 
criminal statute of conviction.45 If the statute is phrased in the alternative, then 
the court must enlist the “modified” categorical approach to determine if the 
state statute is indivisible or divisible.46 To determine divisibility, the court must 
decide if the alternative phrasing is listing various “elements” or various 
“means” of committing the same crime.47  
This process is best illustrated by a famous example from Descamps v. 
United States.48 In this example, the Court creates a hypothetical statute that 
criminalizes assault with a deadly weapon and enumerates weapons including 
knives, guns, and clubs.49 If a conviction can be obtained when the jury agrees 
a weapon was used, but deadlocks on whether the weapon was a gun or a knife, 
then the enumerated weapons are all different “means” of committing a sole 
indivisible crime.50 When a statute is indivisible, the court proceeds to the next 
step in the analysis, only looking at the bare statutory elements.51 On the other 
hand, if the disagreement over the type of weapon would result in a hung jury, 
then the type of weapon would be an “element” and the statute is divisible into 
multiple discrete offenses.52 In the case of a divisible statute, the court is 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (“[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year that . . . is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of 
explosives . . . .”). 
 43 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3, at 1–2.   
 44 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588–89 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 5 (1983)); see also S. REP. 
NO. 98-190, at 20 (1983).  
 45 See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249–51 (2016). 
 46 Id. at 2249 (citation omitted). This adds another layer of complexity to the already 
confusing categorical approach. Judges complain about the modified categorical approach 
in particular. See Lee, supra note 8, at 266–67. 
 47 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249–51. 
 48 Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 270–74 (2013). 
 49 Id. at 271–72. 
 50 Id. at 271. 
 51 See id. at 274. 
 52 See id.  
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permitted to look to certain designated “Shepard documents” in order to 
determine the exact elements of the prior conviction.53 Shepard documents 
include charging documents, transcripts of plea colloquies, written plea 
agreements, jury instructions, and comparable judicial records.54 
Once the prior conviction’s elements are defined, the court must formulate 
the federal generic offense definition.55 Each court will formulate the generic 
definition by relying on a wide range of legal sources.56 For example, in Taylor, 
the Court defined generic burglary, regardless of the exact state definition or 
label, to include the basic elements of “an unlawful or privileged entry into, or 
remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.”57 In 
coming to this conclusion, the Court relied on a range of sources, including the 
Model Penal Code, criminal law treatises by Blackstone and LaFave, English 
common law, and a survey of state robbery statutes in existence at the time 
ACCA was first enacted.58 
Finally, with the generic definition in hand, the court engages in a matching 
exercise with the state conviction under review.59 If the state conviction is a 
“clean match” to the generic offense definition, then the state conviction is 
deemed a violent felony that counts towards the three predicate offenses 
required for ACCA sentencing enhancement.60 If the state conviction does not 
match or otherwise “sweeps more broadly” than the generic offense, the state 
conviction does not qualify as a violent felony and cannot be considered under 
ACCA.61 
C. The Residual Clause 
While not at issue in Stitt, Sims, or Stokeling, the residual clause merits brief 
mention in any significant discussion of ACCA jurisprudence.62 Prosecutors 
once leaned upon the residual clause as a catchall ACCA provision when they 
could not clearly prove a statute was a violent felony under the enumerated-
 
 53 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3, at 2. 
 54 Id.  
 55 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 593–94 (1990) (formulating the federal 
generic offense definition of burglary). 
 56 See id. 
 57 Id. at 598. 
 58 Id. at 593–94. 
 59 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3, at 1. 
 60 United States v. Gattis, 877 F.3d 150, 158 (4th Cir. 2017).   
 61 Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013). 
 62 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (“[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year . . . that . . . involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk 
of physical injury to another . . . .”). 
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felonies clause or elements clause.63 But the residual clause is no longer 
viable.64 
In one of the landmark ACCA cases, Johnson v. United States, the Supreme 
Court held that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and that 
imposing a sentence enhancement under the clause violated the Constitutional 
guarantee to due process.65 In the wake of Johnson, many prisoners who were 
subject to ACCA due to prior convictions secured under the residual clause are 
now appealing their cases with some measure of success.66 
Despite its invalidity, the ACCA residual clause remains relevant by 
analogy to similar provisions in other federal statutes. Recently, the logic of 
Johnson was the driving force behind invalidating a similar residual clause in 
the definition of “aggravated felony” in the Immigration and Nationality Act.67 
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In the October 2018 term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in three 
ACCA cases. Stitt and Sims, consolidated for oral argument, represented classic 
enumerated-felonies clause disputes over the scope of generic robbery.68 
Stokeling v. United States proceeded under the elements clause with a dispute 
over the level of force required by Florida robbery.69 Despite approaching 
different legal questions, these cases typify the same kinds of hair-splitting 
technicalities that plague ACCA and categorical approach jurisprudence. As a 
further testament to the complexity and lack of clarity in ACCA doctrine, these 
cases were all borne of circuit splits.70 
 
 63 See Trevor Burrus, Fifth Time’s a Charm? Why the Court Should Strike Down the 
Armed Career Criminal Act as Unconstitutionally Vague, CATO INST. (Feb. 26, 2015), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/fifth-times-charm-why-court-should-strike-down-armed-career-
criminal-act-unconstitutionally [https://perma.cc/2G25-SYHW] (arguing that the residual 
clause “force[d] the judiciary, not the legislature, to define criminal offenses and establish 
their penalties”); see also Douglas A. Berman, How Many Hundreds (or Thousands?) of 
ACCA Prisoners Could Be Impacted by a Big Ruling in Johnson?, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (June 
13, 2015, 10:07 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/06/
how-many-hundreds-or-thousands-of-acca-prisoners-could-be-impacted-by-a-big-ruling-
in-johnson.html [https://perma.cc/68Y9-45NZ] (discussing judges’ use of the residual clause 
to trigger ACCA). 
 64 See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 
 65 Id.  
 66 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 240 F. Supp. 3d 164, 172–73 (D.D.C. 2017) 
(stating that the inmate was not required to show that the sentencing court relied on the 
ACCA residual clause in order to seek post-conviction relief pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Johnson); see also infra note 83 and accompanying text.  
 67 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1215 (2018). 
 68 See Brief for the United States at I, United States v. Stitt, 138 S. Ct. 1592 (2018) 
(Nos. 17-765 & 17-766).  
 69 Brief for Petitioner at i, Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (No. 17-
5554). 
 70 See infra notes 75–76, 101–102 and accompanying text. 
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A. Enumerated-Felonies Clause Cases 
In Stitt and Sims, the Court examined two state burglary statutes (Tennessee 
aggravated burglary and Arkansas residential burglary respectively) to 
determine whether they fell within the generic ACCA definition of burglary.71 
If the Tennessee and Arkansas burglary statutes matched the generic definition, 
then respondents’ non-ACCA sentences would be upheld.72 If the Court held 
the state convictions swept more broadly than the generic burglary, respondents’ 
cases would be remanded for re-sentencing under ACCA.73  
Both Stitt and Sims presented the question of “[w]hether burglary of a non-
permanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight 
accommodation can qualify as burglary under the [enumerated-felonies clause 
of the] Armed Career Criminal Career Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii).”74  
Notably, the Supreme Court’s decision addressed a broad circuit split. 
Circuits divided on whether a habitable structure that is “non-permanent or 
mobile” qualified as burglary under the ACCA generic definition.75 The Fourth, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits construed a narrow definition of robbery that 
excluded “a vehicle that is adapted for overnight accommodation of persons,” 
while the Tenth and Fifth Circuits found that such structures fall within the 
scope of generic burglary.76 
 
1. United States v. Stitt 
 
In 2011, respondent Victor Stitt got into an argument with his girlfriend, 
then proceeded to “tr[y] to shove a loaded handgun into [her] mouth while 
threatening to kill her.”77 After the neighbors called the police, Stitt fled from 
the authorities.78 Upon capture, Stitt was found with a .22 caliber handgun lying 
on the ground within his reach.79  
Stitt was subsequently indicted and found guilty of one count of violating 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), illegal possession of a firearm by a felon.80 At 
sentencing, the district court found that Stitt had nine prior state convictions for 
 
 71 For a further description of the matching exercise required by the categorical 
approach, see supra Part II.B. 
 72 See Brief for the United States, Stitt, supra note 68, at 14–15.  
 73 See id. at 39. 
 74 Id. at I. 
 75 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, United States v. Stitt, 138 S. Ct. 1592 (2018) 
(No. 17-765). 
 76 Id. at 18–19. 
 77 Brief for the United States, Stitt, supra note 68, at 6. 
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
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“violent felonies” under ACCA, and increased his sentence accordingly to 290 
months imprisonment.81 Of these nine predicate offenses, six were convictions 
for Tennessee aggravated burglary.82 
Stitt appealed to the Sixth Circuit, where three of his nine felony convictions 
were disqualified because they had been designated as violent felonies under the 
voided ACCA residual clause.83 Stitt successfully petitioned for review 
regarding his remaining six convictions for Tennessee aggravated burglary.84 
Over the dissent of six of the fifteen-judge panel, the court of appeals held Stitt’s 
remaining six convictions for Tennessee aggravated burglary were not violent 
felonies under ACCA.85   
The Tennessee aggravated burglary statute in question criminalized the 
burglary of any “habitation,” defined as “any structure, including buildings, 
module units, mobile homes, trailers, and tents, which is designed or adapted 
for the overnight accommodation of persons.”86 The en banc majority concluded 
that no non-permanent or mobile structure, including those defined as 
“habitations” defined in the Tennessee statute, could fit within the narrow 
generic robbery definition of “building[s] or other structure[s].”87  
As a result, Stitt went from having nine qualifying violent felonies to none.88 
His case was remanded for a non-ACCA sentence without the requisite fifteen-
year mandatory minimum sentence.89 The Government appealed the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision.90 
Justice Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court, reversing the 
en banc decision of the Sixth Circuit.91 The Court found that the relevant 
language of the Tennessee statute falls within the generic version of burglary as 
set forth in Taylor.92 The Court’s rationale rested primarily on Taylor’s 
proposition that Congress intended the definition of “burglary” to reflect the 
“generic sense in which the term [was] used in the criminal codes of most 
States” at the time ACCA was passed.93 To that end, an appendix of 1986 state 
statutes included with the opinion shows that the majority of states included 
vehicles adapted or customarily designed for lodging within their state 
statutes.94 
 
 81 Id. at 6–7. 
 82 Id. at 6. 
 83 Brief for the United States, Stitt, supra note 68, at 7. 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
 86 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Stitt, supra note 75, at 4 (citing TENN. CODE. ANN. § 
39-14-401(1) (Supp. 2001)). 
 87 Id. at 5 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)). 
 88 See Brief for the United States, Stitt, supra note 68, at 6–7. 
 89 Id. at 7. 
 90 Id. at 2. 
 91 United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 408 (2018). 
 92 Id. at 406. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 408.  
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After Stitt, the federal generic definition of burglary relevant for ACCA now 
includes any “vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight 
accommodations” in addition to its traditional definition covering 
“dwellings.”95 Accordingly, Stitt’s Tennessee state robbery conviction was 
reinstated as a predicate for ACCA enhanced sentencing.96  
2. United States v. Sims 
In 2014, Josh Daniel Sims broke into a home in St. Francis County, 
Arkansas and stole a rifle.97 Sims was indicted and pleaded guilty to being a 
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).98 At 
sentencing, the district court determined in addition to two “serious drug 
crimes,” Sims had also been convicted of two prior “violent felonies” for 
Arkansas residential burglary, yielding an ACCA enhanced sentence of 210 
months.99  
While conceding his two serious drug offenses, Sims appealed his Arkansas 
convictions for residential burglary, arguing that they were not predicate violent 
felonies.100 The Eighth Circuit agreed, holding that the Arkansas residential 
burglary statute swept more broadly than the generic definition of burglary 
because it included “vehicles used or adapted for overnight accommodation.”101 
In the court’s view, no vehicular burglary could fall within the scope of generic 
burglary, even if limited to vehicles used as homes.102 
As a result, Sims’ two “violent felonies” were invalidated and his case was 
remanded back to the district court for sentencing as a non-violent offender.103 
The Government appealed Eighth Circuit’s denial of en banc review.104  
In its consolidated opinion with Stitt, the Court came to the same conclusion 
in Sims regarding the definition of federal burglary and its inclusion of “vehicles 
adapted for overnight use.”105 However, the Court took the additional step of 
remanding Sims to the lower courts because Sims alleged that the wording of 
the Arkansas statute—“a vehicle . . . [i]n which any person lives”—may be so 
broad as to include a car where a homeless person sleeps.106 After Mathis, it is 
well settled that a statute including an ordinary vehicle like a car would be 
outside the generic definition of burglary.107 The Court citing its status as a 
“court of review, not of first view,” determined this “car” argument rested upon 
 
 95 Id. at 403–04. 
 96 Id. at 408. 
 97 Brief for the United States, Stitt, supra note 68, at 11. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Id. at 11–12.  
 100 Id. at 12. 
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. at 12–13. 
 103 Brief for the United States, Stitt, supra note 68, at 12. 
 104 Id. at 13. 
 105 United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 407 (2018). 
 106 Id. 
 107 See id. 
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a novel question of state law.108 The Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
and remanded the case for consideration consistent with its decision.109  
B. Elements Clause Case 
The second ACCA case before the Court came from an appeal by a 
defendant out of the Eleventh Circuit.110 The question presented was:  
Is a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common law 
requirement of overcoming “victim resistance” categorically a “violent felony” 
under… the [the elements clause of the] Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another”), if the offense 
has been specifically interpreted by state appellate courts to require only slight 
force to overcome resistance?111 
In Stokeling, the Supreme Court waded into another complex legal issue that 
split circuits. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits directly conflicted with the 
Fourth Circuit on whether state robbery statutes that require “overcoming victim 
resistance” categorically require “violent force.”112  More specifically, the Ninth 
Circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit decision below on the exact Florida 
robbery statute in question and whether it qualifies as a “violent felony” under 
ACCA.113  
1. Stokeling v. United States 
In 2016, Denard Stokeling pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a 
firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1) after 
being caught burglarizing a restaurant with an accomplice in Miami, Florida.114 
The sentencing court found Stokeling was eligible for an ACCA enhancement 
because he had prior convictions for two “violent felonies” and one “serious 
drug offense.”115 Specifically, Stokeling had one conviction for unarmed 
Florida robbery, one conviction for armed robbery, and one conviction for the 
sale, manufacture, or delivery of cocaine.116 Stokeling objected to his Florida 
unarmed robbery conviction qualifying as a violent felony, claiming that the 
 
 108 Id. at 407–08 (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005)). 
 109 Id. at 408.  
 110 Brief for the Petitioner, Stokeling, supra note 69, at 10. 
 111 Id. at i.  
 112 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20–28, Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 
(2019) (No. 17-5554). 
 113 See Brief for the Petitioner, Stokeling, supra note 69, at 10 (citing United States v. 
Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 898–901 (9th Cir. 2017)). 
 114 See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 2, Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. 
Ct. 544 (2019) (No. 17-5554). 
 115 Id. at 3–4.  
 116 Brief for the United States at 2, United States v. Stokeling, 684 F. App’x 870, 871 
(11th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1438 (2018), and aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (No. 
16-12951-CC).  
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offense did not categorically require the use of violent force.117 In response, the 
Government argued that Florida case law shows that the Florida unarmed 
robbery statute in question requires “resistance by the victim that is overcome 
by the physical force of the offender.”118 
Despite the fact that Florida robbery requires “physical force” sufficient to 
overcome the victim’s resistance, the district court agreed with Stokeling that 
even “physical force” that overcomes resistance is not categorically equivalent 
to “violent force” cognized by ACCA and Johnson.119 The district court pointed 
to prior Florida cases where prying the fingers of someone clutching dollar bills 
or engaging in a tug-of-war was sufficient physical force to overcome victim 
resistance without necessarily qualifying as violent force.120  
The United States appealed the district court decision and the Eleventh 
Circuit vacated and remanded Stokeling’s case for re-sentencing under 
ACCA.121 Stokeling appealed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision with the same 
“level of force” argument he used successfully at the district court level.122  
In a 5–4 decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, 
finding that Florida robbery qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense under the 
elements clause.123 Justice Thomas authored the majority opinion, which 
rejected Stokeling’s attempt to distinguish “physical force” from ACCA 
predicate “violent force.”124 Instead, Thomas opined that “physical force” 
includes any amount of force used to overcome victim resistance, which the 
Florida robbery law satisfied in this case.125 Thomas’s rationale focused on the 
common law definitions of force, noting that “[t]he common law also did not 
distinguish between gradations of ‘violence’” and citing numerous treatises 
using the words “violence” and “force” interchangeably.126 The majority 
concluded that Congress intended for ACCA to incorporate these common law 
definitions into its federal generic definition of robbery.127  
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued forcefully that the Florida robbery 
statute covers too broad a range of conduct to qualify as a “violent felony.”128 
Sotomayor rejected the majority’s conclusion that Congress adopted common 
law definitions of force into ACCA.129 She argued that even accepting the 
 
 117 Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 114, at 4. 
 118 Id. at 6–7 (citing Robinson v. State, 692 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1997)).  
 119 Id. at 4.  
 120 Brief for the United States at 30–31, Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) 
(No. 17-5554). 
 121 Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 114, at 5. 
 122 See id. at 4–5. 
 123 Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 555 (2019). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 550. 
 127 Id. at 551. 
 128 Id. at 556 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 129 Stokeling, 139 S. Ct. 544, 559 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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premise that ACCA did originally intend to incorporate common law definitions 
of force into its definition of violent felony, the majority had ignored Johnson, 
which clearly elevated the degree of force required to a “heightened degree of 
force.”130  
IV. PUTTING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH BACK INTO PERSPECTIVE 
A. ACCA and the Categorical Approach: First Principles  
The Armed Career Criminal Act was originally drafted in 1984 as part of 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.131 The bill reflected the growing anxiety 
about rising crime levels, especially the fear that a large percentage of crimes 
involving theft or violence were committed by a small number of dangerous 
“career” offenders.132 As such, Congress passed ACCA to impose long terms of 
incarceration for what were perceived to be the most violent and dangerous of 
these “career” offenders––those that illegally possessed firearms.133 
Importantly, ACCA was specifically drafted with robbery and burglary in mind 
because these were perceived to be crimes that presented the highest risk of 
victimization by an armed offender.134 
At its core, the fundamental purpose of ACCA is to classify dangerous 
felons whose crimes are severe enough to warrant sentencing enhancement.135 
The categorical approach is merely a mechanism derived from the text and 
legislative history of ACCA to achieve this goal, while also safeguarding against 
potential unfairness that would result from a conduct-based approach.136 
To facilitate the categorical approach, Congress adopted modern views of 
generic burglary and other crimes “roughly corresponding” to the definitions of 
the crime found in most states at the time of enactment.137 This was done 
because it “both prevented offenders from invoking the arcane technicalities of 
the common-law definition of burglary to evade the sentence-enhancement 
provision, and protected offenders from the unfairness of having enhancement 
depend upon the label employed by the State of conviction.”138 This statement 
 
 130 Id. at 558–61. 
 131 See Evans, supra note 5, at 629.  
 132 Id. at 630–33. 
 133 See Brief for the United States, Stitt, supra note 68, at 3 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-
1073, at 26901 (1984)). 
 134 See Evans, supra note 5, at 630.  
 135 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581, 587–88 (1990).  
 136 See id. at 590. Nor is there any indication that Congress ever abandoned its general 
approach, when designating predicate offenses, of using uniform, categorical definitions to 
capture all offenses of a certain level of seriousness involving violence or an inherent risk 
thereof, and that are likely to be committed by career offenders, regardless of technical 
definitions and labels under state law. Id. 
 137 Id. at 589.  
 138 Id.   
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by the Court in Taylor encompasses the chief purpose and first principle of the 
Court’s categorical approach to ACCA.  
B. First Principles Applied  
The categorical approach serves ACCA’s function of designating “career 
offenders” who commit violent felonies as efficiently as possible while striving 
to minimize negative externalities.139 The courts should use the categorical 
approach to interpret the designated predicate offense categories in a way that 
will include offenders who belong in the “violent career offender” category by 
not letting them escape justice on a technicality, while at the same time 
excluding offenders who do not warrant such severe sentence enhancements.140 
This simple goal has been obscured by years of abstract legal doctrine, and the 
Supreme Court has missed another opportunity to explicitly ground ACCA 
doctrine in practical principles in its three most recent ACCA cases.141 
1. Including Those Who Do Belong Under ACCA: Stitt and Sims 
In striving to properly designate “career offenders” with minimum negative 
externalities, the Court properly decided in favor of the government in Stitt and 
Sims by including burglary of “vehicles adapted for overnight accommodation” 
within the generic definition of burglary.  
The categorical approach intends to prevent offenders from invoking 
“arcane technicalities of the common-law” to evade the sentence enhancement 
provision, while also protecting offenders from the unfairness of sentencing 
based on state statutory labeling alone.142 The abstract debate of whether a 
“mobile home” is actually a “habitation” looks more like the invocation of a 
legal technicality than a justified defense against an overly broad state statute.  
In Stitt and Sims, the Court properly avoided the pitfalls of arcane common 
law. Citing Taylor, the Court reasoned that Congress intended ACCA to include 
a “uniform definition of burglary [to] be applied to all cases in which the 
Government” seeks enhanced sentencing and that it “must include more” than 
just the “classic” common-law definition of breaking into a dwelling at night 
with intent to commit a felony.143 This common law definition including only 
“dwellings,” the Court noted, would be of “little relevance to modern law 
 
 139 See id. at 587–90. This Note defines “negative externalities” as scenarios where 
relatively minor criminals are unfairly swept up in an overly broad statute, or conversely, 
dangerous violent felons escape the intended ACCA sentence enhancement.  
 140 See id. 
 141 See Tristan v. United States, No. 6:16-cv-01137-AA, 2018 WL 3117637, at *3 n.2 
(D. Or. June 25, 2018). 
 142 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 589 (1990). 
 143 United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 405 (2018). 
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enforcement concerns.”144 Instead, the Court focused on the state criminal codes 
contemporaneous to the passage of ACCA.145 
Moreover, the pedantic debate over whether a mobile home is a home as 
defined by its “use or purpose” or a vehicle by its “form or nature” is the exact 
kind of abstraction the categorical approach should depart from.146 Surely 
Congress did not intend for the distinction of “violent felony” to hinge on 
whether a discerning robber chose to rob the same habitation with or without 
wheels.147 Furthermore, to the extent Congress was concerned about the 
inherent risk of violence and victimization by an armed burglar, excluding 
mobile homes over a technical definition of “habitation” seems inapposite to the 
goal of incarcerating dangerous offenders.148  
The Court properly incorporated Taylor’s logic on this point into its opinion. 
Acknowledging that Taylor “viewed burglary as an inherently dangerous crime 
because burglary creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between the 
offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to 
investigate,” the Court recognized that an offender who breaks into a mobile 
home, RV, camping tent, or other lodging structure “runs a similar or greater 
risk of violent confrontation.”149  
In sum, while failing to simplify or advance categorical approach doctrine, 
the Court’s decisions in Stitt and Sims embodied a reasonable application of the 
categorical approach’s first principles expressed in Taylor. At very least, ACCA 
critics can rejoice that these cases did not further complicate the doctrine, a 
quality not shared by other relatively recent ACCA decisions like Mathis and 
Descamps. 
2. Excluding Those Who May Not Belong Under ACCA: Stokeling 
On the other hand, a more purpose-driven interpretation of the categorical 
approach would have counseled in favor of the criminal defendant and led the 
Court to the opposite result of its holding in Stokeling. By lowering the threshold 
of force necessary for an offense to qualify as a violent felony under ACCA, 
Stokeling expands ACCA’s reach to cover an even greater number of state 
offenses. In this way, Stokeling presents exactly the type of ill the categorical 
approach was designed to prevent––comparatively innocent offenders being 
swept up into an overly broad state criminal statute.150  
 
 144 Id. (citation omitted).   
 145 See id. 
 146 See Brief for the United States, Stitt, supra note 68, at 16. 
 147 See id. at 11 (referencing how Judge Sutton pointed out in his en banc dissent that 
“the majority’s conclusion ‘produces th[e] head-scratching outcome’ that ‘Tennessee’s 
lesser crime of “burglary of a building” qualifies as generic burglary while aggravated 
burglary—i.e., burglary of a habitation—‘does not’”). 
 148 See id. at 3.  
 149 United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 406 (2018) (citation omitted). 
 150 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 589 (1990). 
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While the majority opinion remains mired in abstraction on the proper 
definition of “force,” Justice Sotomayor’s dissent incisively captures the 
purpose of ACCA. She writes: “[ACCA] does not look to past crimes simply to 
get a sense of whether a particular defendant is generally a recidivist; rather, it 
looks to past crimes to determine specifically ‘the kind or degree of danger the 
offender would pose were he to possess a gun.’”151 In other words, the crime 
should show an “increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who 
might deliberately point [a] gun and pull the trigger.”152  
Congress did not intend for the type of low-level “glorified pickpockets” 
encompassed by the Florida robbery law to be subject to a 15-year mandatory 
prison sentence under ACCA.153 Stealing a necklace, shoplifting, purse-
snatching, and the like “do not bear the hallmarks of being the kind of people 
who are likely to point a gun and pull the trigger,” 154 and should be excluded 
from ACCA enhanced sentencing under the foundational purposes of the 
categorical approach. Focusing exclusively on the metaphysical definition of 
force obfuscates a simple truth recognized by Taylor: petty criminals should not 
be subject to a “career criminal” statute designed for dangerous violent felons 
prone to gun violence.155  
While failing to move the ball forward on ACCA, Justice Sotomayor’s 
dissent offers some degree of hope for ACCA’s many critics. At very least, it 
shows that a coalition on the Court across ideologies recognizes the need to 
return a measure of common sense and practicality to ACCA jurisprudence. 
Ideally, her opinion marks the first step in a shift towards mitigating some of 
ACCA’s harsh results by returning the categorical approach to its first principles 
expressed in Taylor.156  
V. CONCLUSION 
Years of adding complexity to ACCA doctrine has rendered the categorical 
approach increasingly “unworkable” and “abstract and untethered to the real 
world.”157 The Supreme Court’s approach to Stitt, Sims, and Stokeling presents 
a missed opportunity to change this narrative around ACCA and the categorical 
approach. This Note advocates a modest proposition to ground the doctrine back 
 
 151 Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 559 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted).   
 152 Id. (citing Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008)) (alteration in original). 
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 155 See Evans, supra note 5, at 630–33.  
 156 See supra Part IV.A.   
 157 See, e.g., Tristan v. United States, No. 6:16-cv-01137-AA, 2018 WL 3117637, at *3 
n.2 (D. Or. June 25, 2018). 
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in a degree of practicality: refocus on the categorical approach’s exceedingly 
practical fundamental principles rather than its “maddening” legal formalism.158 
Critics will always struggle to accept that dangerous criminals (who would 
be properly designated as such by a conduct-based approach) may escape 
enhanced sentencing under the categorical approach.159 However, until 
Congress changes ACCA, this is exactly within the fundamental purposes of the 
categorical approach––to prevent one shoplifter from being sentenced as a 
violent felon even if ninety-nine bank robbers get lesser sentences.160 The 
solution to this result is not to add more complexity to an already oversaturated 
legal doctrine, but to encourage states to more carefully define criminal statutes 
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